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BAIL – SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: PRE-TRIAL RELEASE
CONDITIONS IMPOSED UNDER NORTH DAKOTA
RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 46(a)(2)(M)
REQUIRE EXPLICIT FINDINGS
State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, 809 N.W.2d 309
ABSTRACT
In State v. Hayes, the North Dakota Supreme Court held a district court
abuses its discretion when it imposes a pretrial release condition on a
defendant requiring her to submit to warrantless searches and seizures of
her person, vehicle, and home under North Dakota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 46(a)(2)(M), without first finding those conditions were
necessary. In addition, the court held when a person is left between the
choice of violating his or her bail conditions or consenting to a search, the
person is unable to consent without coercion. Finally, the court held the
good faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the
officer’s enforcement of the bond order signed by the district court. The
decision in Hayes will significantly affect pretrial release in North Dakota,
because district courts will no longer be able to impose any pretrial release
conditions under Rule 46(a)(2)(M) without an explicit finding of their
appropriateness in a neutral and detached manner.
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FACTS

On December 1, 2008, Divide County Sheriff’s Deputy Rob Melby
initiated a traffic stop on Anna Hayes.1 Deputy Melby testified he stopped
Hayes because he recognized her as she was driving, and he was aware that
she was on the Divide County Sheriff Department’s monthly list of
suspended drivers.2 Deputy Melby arrested Hayes for driving with a
suspended driver’s license.3
When Hayes was searched subsequent to her arrest, the officer found
marijuana and six hundred dollars in cash on her person.4 Another $2133 in
cash was also found inside of Hayes’ purse.5 The State charged Hayes with
driving with a suspended license and possession of a controlled substance
while driving a motor vehicle.6 Hayes had an initial appearance on
December 10, 2008, where the State requested a cash bond.7 The State also
requested the bond order require Hayes to submit to random drug testing as
well as warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and home. 8 The district
court granted the State’s entire request, and asserted the random drug
testing was a standard bond requirement for a person charged with a drug
violation.9 The district court gave no explanation as to why it ordered the
warrantless search requirement.10
Immediately after the bond conditions were imposed by the district
court, law enforcement officers confronted Hayes outside of the courtroom
and asked for her to consent to a search of her home.11 Hayes was informed
she could either consent to the search or risk violating her bond
conditions.12 Faced with this Hobson’s choice, Hayes consented.13 Officers
searched the address listed on Hayes’ driver’s license and found various
items of drug paraphernalia.14 There was a dispute about whether the

1. State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 2, 809 N.W.2d 309, 312.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. ¶ 3.
5. Id.
6. Id. Driving with a suspended license is a class B misdemeanor. N.D. CENT. CODE § 3906-42 (2008). Possession of a controlled substance while driving a motor vehicle is a class A
misdemeanor. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(1) (Supp. 2011).
7. Hayes, ¶ 3, 809 N.W.2d at 312.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. ¶ 4.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. ¶ 5-6, 809 N.W.2d at 313.
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address listed on Hayes’ driver’s license was her residence.15 During the
search, Hayes was given a Miranda16 warning, admitted to using
methamphetamine roughly two days prior to the search,17 and stated she
would test positive for marijuana use.18 As a result of the search, the State
brought four new charges against Hayes: two each for drug paraphernalia
possession and two for ingesting a controlled substance relating to
methamphetamine and marijuana.19
Before trial, Hayes moved to suppress all evidence seized during the
warrantless search conducted after her initial appearance for the driving
under suspension violation.20 Hayes argued the search violated her Fourth
Amendment rights, but the district court disagreed and denied her motion.21
A jury found Hayes guilty of all six charges.22 On appeal, only the four
charges that were brought subsequent to the warrantless search of Hayes’
home were at issue.23
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are many aspects of the American legal system that are
considered fundamental. Arguably, most fundamental is the concept that
people are innocent until proven guilty.24 From this philosophy emerged
the concept of bail.25 Bail was said to be formed from the presumption of
innocence rooted in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,26 which
required defendants charged with noncapital crimes be released on bail,

15. Id. ¶ 4, 809 N.W.2d at 312-13.
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. Hayes, ¶ 6, 809 N.W.2d at 313.
18. Id.
19. Id. ¶ 7; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.4-03 (2009) (prohibiting possession of drug
paraphernalia); id. § 19-03.1-22 (prohibiting ingestion of scheduled drugs without a prescription).
20. Hayes, ¶ 8, 809 N.W.2d at 313.
21. Id.
22. Id. The six charges consisted of: the two charges originally filed against Hayes – driving
with a suspended license and possession of a controlled substance while driving a motor vehicle –
and the four charges filed subsequent to the search of Hayes’ home. See id. ¶¶ 3, 7, 809 N.W.2d
at 312-13.
23. See id. ¶ 13, 809 N.W.2d at 314. Hayes’ appeal was centered upon the district court’s
denial of her motion to suppress the evidence discovered at her home during the warrantless
search. Id. Since the two original charges were not founded on that evidence, the court affirmed
the two convictions that arose from her original arrest on December 1, 2008. Id.
24. See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723,
727 (2011); see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there
is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”).
25. See Baradaran, supra note 24, at 731.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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since a determination of guilt could not occur until trial.27 Understanding
the statutory limitations that have now been imposed on granting a criminal
defendant bail in North Dakota requires a brief review of the rules
governing bail in this state.
Section A will briefly discuss the North Dakota constitutional
requirement for bail. Section B will discuss North Dakota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 46. Finally, Section C will briefly discuss the Bail Reform Acts
of 1966 and 1984.
A. NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTIONAL BAIL REQUIREMENT
In the State of North Dakota, “[a]ll persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or
the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted.”28 By
adopting this approach to bail in its constitution, North Dakota joins
twenty-two other states29 that are considered to have a “traditional”
constitutional bail provision.30 The “traditional” bail provision is one that
expressly grants a right to bail, with capital charges being the only narrow
exception to this right.31
The fact North Dakota chose to make bail a right of its citizens, unless
they are charged with a capital offense, while the United States Constitution
did not,32 demonstrates the state’s preference for pretrial release.33 This
belief was demonstrated shortly after the North Dakota Constitution was

27. See Baradaran, supra note 24, at 731.
28. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11.
29. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.3(b), at 48 (3d ed. 2007); see
also ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 17;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. § 9; KY. CONST. § 16; ME. CONST. art. I, § 10; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 21; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 7,
N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 11; OR. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8;
TENN. CONST. art. II, § 15; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
30. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 12.3(b), at 48.
31. Id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating only that “excessive bail shall not be required,” not that
bail was a guaranteed right).
33. States may seek to demonstrate their own power in construing their laws their own way,
even when a federal version of those laws already exists. This is commonly referred to as “new
federalism.” What is New Federalism?, THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/newfederalism/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). “[W]hile a State is free as a matter of its own law to
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards, it may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal
constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.” Arkansas v.
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (citations omitted).
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adopted in In re West,34 in which the North Dakota Supreme Court held bail
was not guaranteed to defendant’s charged in capital crimes, although it
could still be granted using judicial discretion.35 The preference for release
in North Dakota has continued to be present in the courts36 as well as the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.37
B. NORTH DAKOTA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 46
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46, which governs a
defendant’s release from custody, is modeled after its federal counterpart,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46.38 The Federal Rule was adopted in
1944 and required courts to consider several factors when determining bail;
namely, “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of
the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail
and the character of the defendant.”39 While some scholars argue the
opportunity for bail in the federal system is waning as the percentage of
defendants being held before trial is significantly increasing,40 that does not
mean North Dakota is following suit.41 Rule 46 is still interpreted to state a
clear preference for the unconditional release of accused persons in North
Dakota – either based on their own recognizance or an unsecured bond that
is meant to reasonably assure their appearance at trial.42
Since Rule 46 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure
mirrors Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46, it has subsequently been
amended following the Federal Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984.43
Although, notwithstanding one exception for persons charged with
controlled substance offenses, these amendments have not changed what
conditions can be imposed on a recipient of bail in North Dakota.44
34. 88 N.W. 88 (N.D. 1901).
35. In re West, 88 N.W. at 90. While bail was not granted in this case due to the particular
circumstances surrounding the crime, it was still held that bail could be granted in capital cases in
North Dakota. Id.
36. See City of Fargo v. Stutlien, 505 N.W.2d 738, 743 (N.D. 1993) (holding a court rule
providing minimum periods of detention before arrestees are granted pretrial release was
unlawful).
37. See discussion infra Part II.B.
38. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46 cmt.
39. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1951).
40. See Baradaran, supra note 24, at 752.
41. See supra Part II.A.
42. State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 20, 809 N.W.2d 309, 316.
43. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46 cmt.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-46 (2009). This statute mandates that courts impose an
additional condition of release or bail on an individual who has been arrested upon a felony drug
violation, that they not use any controlled substances without a valid prescription from a licensed
medical practitioner and, that they submit to random drug testing while they are out on bail. Id.
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C. THE BAIL REFORM ACTS
There have been two major federal Bail Reform Acts – one in 196645
and one in 1984.46 The Bail Reform Act of 1966 was a result of concern
about excessive pretrial detention of defendants.47 The Bail Reform Act of
1984 was largely enacted in order to ensure potentially dangerous
defendants would be prevented from being released into the public prior to
trial.48
1.

Bail Reform Act of 1966

Congress stated the purpose of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (1966 Act)
was “to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all persons,
regardless of their financial status,49 shall not needlessly be detained
pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal,
when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”50
This statement of legislative purpose was widely interpreted to mean the
1966 Act preferred the release of accused persons.51 Not only was it
believed the 1966 Act preferred release, it was also interpreted to mean that
conditions of release should only be imposed if absolutely necessary.52
Further, the hearings held by Congress relating to the 1966 Act
demonstrated its philosophy that conditions of release were only necessary
if they were needed to ensure the defendants’ appearance in court.53 The
United States Supreme Court had also previously handed down key

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214.
Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976.
Baradaran, supra note 24, at 739.
Id. at 747-48.
See John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1985) (stating the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was “aimed
principally at eliminating the use of inappropriate pretrial detention, especially among poor
defendants held in crowded urban jails”).
50. Paul G. Reiter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions of Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1966 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3146, 3147) Governing Pretrial Release or Bail of Persons
Charged with Noncapital Offense, 8 A.L.R. FED. 586, 598 (1971).
51. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Bail should be denied
under the Bail Reform Act [of 1966] only as a matter of last resort.”); United States v. Schiavo,
587 F.2d 532, 533 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding the standards of the 1966 Bail Reform Act have a
“presumption in favor of releasability”); United States v. Honeyman, 470 F.2d 473, 474 (9th Cir.
1972) (“The whole spirit of the Bail Reform Act [of 1966] . . . is that a defendant facing trial
should be released, rather than detained, unless there are strong reasons for not releasing him.”).
52. Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“The Bail Reform Act [of
1966] creates a strong policy in favor of release on personal recognizance, and it is only if such a
release would not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required that other conditions
of release may be imposed.”).
53. Baradaran, supra note 24, at 739.
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decisions regarding the purpose of bail – one of which was Stack v. Boyle.54
In Stack, the Court stated the function of bail was limited, and the fixing of
bail for any defendant “must be based upon standards relevant to the
purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”55 Thus, the 1966 Act
seemed to codify both public sentiment56 as well as prior Supreme Court
decisions.
2.

Bail Reform Act of 1984

The call for a second bail reform emerged after legislatures were
scrutinizing bail practices during the 1980s due to the public’s heightened
fear of crime that began in the mid-1970s.57 The basis for the change of
ideology was based upon the belief that:
[T]here is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous
defendants as to whom neither the imposition of stringent release
conditions nor the prospect of revocation of release can reasonably
assure the safety of the community or other persons. It is with
respect to this limited group of offenders that the courts must be
given the power to deny release pending trial.58
This belief prompted many to feel the 1966 Act had several shortcomings
that needed to be rectified.59 One of the main changes to bail laws
following the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (1984 Act) was the implementation
of vague references to “danger.”60 Following the 1984 Act, “danger”
references are now found in three separate contexts in bail laws across the
country: “(1) provisions excluding particular categories of defendants from
the right to bail and/or pretrial release;61 (2) provisions discussing
‘conditions of release’; and (3) provisions discussing the factors to be
weighed by judges in fixing bail or other conditions of release.”62 While
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 was originally adapted from
the 1966 Act,63 in 1995, it was amended to closely follow the 1984 Act.64
54. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
55. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
56. Goldkamp, supra note 49, at 3-4.
57. Id. at 1.
58. Id. at 1-2 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983)).
59. Id. at 2.
60. Baradaran, supra note 24, at 748-49.
61. The fact that “dangerousness” was now allowed to help determine whether bail would be
granted was quickly challenged and upheld by the United States Supreme Court. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (holding the authorization of pretrial detention based on future
dangerousness does not violate due process).
62. Goldkamp, supra note 49, at 19.
63. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46 cmt.
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III. ANALYSIS
In State v. Hayes,65 Justice Sandstrom wrote the opinion of the court,
holding: (1) it is an abuse of discretion to require a pretrial defendant to
consent to warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and residence as a
condition of her bail; (2) Hayes did not voluntarily consent to the search
due to duress; and (3) the good faith exception to the warrant requirement
did not apply regard to the bond order issued by the district court.66 Due to
the lack of specific findings issued when the pretrial release conditions were
imposed on Hayes, the court reversed the four convictions that had resulted
from the warrantless search of Hayes’ home.67
A. WARRANTLESS SEARCH REQUIREMENT
The question of whether a defendant could be forced to consent to
warrantless searches as a condition of bail was an issue of first impression
in North Dakota.68 When deciding the issue, the court first considered
whether the constitutionality of the pretrial release condition needed to be
decided.69 The court then looked to North Dakota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 46 to determine if the pretrial condition was allowed under North
Dakota law.70 Finally, the court looked to a Ninth Circuit case, United
States v. Scott,71 to help determine if special findings should be required
before the imposition of bail conditions that are not specifically enumerated
under the North Dakota rule.72
1.

Deciding Constitutional Issues

Hayes’ argument in her original motion to suppress was based on
constitutional issues.73 Hayes argued the bond condition requiring her to
submit to warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and residence violated
her Fourth Amendment rights.74 However, the court noted its preference is
64. Id. The purpose of the 1995 Amendments were “to make the safety of any other person
or the community a relevant consideration when determining which conditions of release will
reasonably assure the appearance of a person charged with an offense.” Id.
65. 2012 ND 9, 809 N.W.2d 309.
66. Hayes, ¶ 15, 809 N.W.2d at 315. There was also a holding relating to a preliminary
matter stating Defendant had standing to contest the search of her alleged residence. Id.
67. Id. ¶ 44, 809 N.W.2d at 322.
68. Id. ¶ 16, 809 N.W.2d at 315.
69. Id.
70. Id. ¶ 20, 809 N.W.2d at 316.
71. 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2005).
72. Hayes, ¶¶ 25-26, 809 N.W.2d at 318.
73. Id. ¶ 8, 809 N.W.2d at 313.
74. Id.
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to “refrain from deciding constitutional questions if [we] can decide a
dispute on other grounds.”75 This preference led the court to shift its
analysis towards existing North Dakota law.
2.

North Dakota Law

The court first noted the state constitution guarantees the right to bail
unless the person is charged with a capital offense.76 This right is bolstered
by the fact that “[a]n accused released on pretrial bail has not been tried and
is presumed innocent.”77 Hayes was using this “presumed innocent”
argument to show she should not have been required to consent to
warrantless searches because she did not have the same lowered expectation
of privacy as a person on probation.78 The court stated Hayes’ argument
raised issues regarding “the conditions for pretrial release of an accused
under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a).”79
Following traditional methods of analysis, the court first looked at the
plain language of the statute.80 After looking at the language, the court
found North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(1) “establishes a
clear preference for the unconditional release of accused persons on their
own personal recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond to
reasonably assure their appearance at trial.”81 However, the court noted
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2) grants magistrates the
power to impose release conditions either in addition to or in lieu of the
methods of release that are given in Rule 46(a)(1).82 The court inferred the
language of the rule requires the conditions be related to the goal of
reasonably assuring an accused will appear at trial.83 The court also noted
the rule lists twelve specific conditions that could be imposed for pretrial
release as well as one “catch-all” provision.84
While the district court did not specifically state which release
condition listed under Rule 46(a)(2) allowed for warrantless searches, the
court concluded it could only have been imposed under Rule 46(a)(2)(M)

75. Id. ¶ 16, 809 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting Little v. Graff, 507 N.W.2d 55, 59 (N.D. 1993));
see Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347, 350 (N.D. 1986); Bismarck Pub. Sch. v.
Walker, 370 N.W.2d 565, 566 (N.D. 1985); In re Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 814 (N.D. 1985).
76. Hayes, ¶ 17, 809 N.W.2d at 315 (citing N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11).
77. Id. ¶ 18.
78. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 809 N.W.2d at 316.
79. Id. ¶ 20.
80. See N. X-Ray Co. v. State ex rel. Hanson, 542 N.W.2d 733, 735 (N.D. 1996).
81. Hayes, ¶ 20, 809 N.W.2d at 316.
82. Id. ¶ 21.
83. Id.
84. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22, 809 N.W.2d at 316-17.
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since it was not explicitly listed in any of the previous twelve provisions.85
The court then focused on North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure
46(a)(3), which states there are “seven factors that a magistrate ‘must
consider’ when imposing pretrial release conditions to reasonably assure the
appearance of an accused at trial.”86
Citing In re York,87 a California case, the court noted other jurisdictions
allow consent to warrantless searches and seizures to be implemented as a
pretrial release condition.88 However, those conditions “must be supported
by probable cause and be justified by the totality of the circumstances
because of Fourth Amendment reasonableness and the presumption of
innocence enjoyed by an accused.”89 The court’s choice to look toward
outside jurisdictions’ interpretations of similar provisions is harmonious
with its previous methods of analysis.90
The court found In re York persuasive.91 As persuasive authority, the
obligation of the district court was to inquire about the release conditions
requested by the state, and their relevancy to assuring an accused person’s
appearance at trial.92 That persuasiveness, combined with the requirement
under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(3) to consider certain
factors before imposing pretrial release conditions, led the court to its
ultimate holding regarding the requirement of special findings.93
3.

United States v. Scott and the Requirement of
Special Findings

Because this was a case of first impression in North Dakota, Hayes’
argument relied heavily on United States v. Scott,94 a case out of the Ninth

85. Id. ¶ 22, 809 N.W.2d at 317.
86. Id. ¶ 23 (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(3)). The seven factors to be considered are:
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (B) the weight of the
evidence against the person; (C) the person’s family ties, employment, financial
resources, character and mental condition; (D) the length of the person’s residence in
the community; (E) the person’s record of convictions; (F) the person’s record of
appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear
voluntarily at court proceedings; and (G) the nature and seriousness of the danger to
any person or the community posed by the person’s release.
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(3).
87. 892 P.2d 804 (1995).
88. Hayes, ¶ 25, 809 N.W.2d at 318.
89. Id.
90. See City of Fargo v. Levine, 2008 ND 64, ¶ 7, 747 N.W.2d 130, 133; State v. Ensminger,
542 N.W.2d 722, 723 (N.D. 1996).
91. Hayes, ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Circuit. The Scott court held warrantless searches which were imposed as a
pretrial release condition required a showing of probable cause – even if the
accused had signed a consent form.95 The court agreed with Hayes’ that
Scott was persuasive and frequently referred to that decision in its
analysis.96
Following the analysis laid out in Scott, the court looked to the record
to determine whether evidence or testimony at Hayes’ initial appearance
was offered to show that it was likely she would not appear at trial without
the imposition of the warrantless search conditions.97 The court noted
“[t]he state ‘cannot short-circuit the process by claiming that the arrest itself
is sufficient to establish that the warrantless search conditions are
required.’”98 While the State argued the conditions put upon Hayes were
made only after an individualized evaluation by the district court, the North
Dakota Court disagreed.99
The court concluded by holding special findings are necessary when a
district court imposes a condition of pretrial release under North Dakota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2)(M).100 The reviewing court must be
able “to review the district court’s reasoning to determine whether it abused
its discretion in imposing release conditions unnecessarily restrictive to
reasonably assure a defendant’s appearance at trial.”101 The court’s
approach to the bail condition issue consisted of relying on authority from
outside jurisdictions and blending that authority with existing North Dakota
law.102 This methodology is on par with the court’s previous approach to
issues of first impression in the State.103 In making its holding, the court
guaranteed a condition must be supported by special findings that would
closely resemble the probable cause finding required by the Ninth Circuit;
unless and until the North Dakota Legislative Assembly explicitly allows
magistrates to implement a condition of consent to warrantless searches for
persons eligible for pretrial release.104

95. Scott, 450 F.3d at 872.
96. Hayes, ¶¶ 25-26, 31-33, 809 N.W.2d at 318-20.
97. Id. ¶ 31, 809 N.W.2d at 319.
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2005)).
99. Id. ¶ 33, 809 N.W.2d at 320 (stating no individualized evaluation was found in the
record).
100. Id. ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318.
101. Id. ¶ 34, 809 N.W.2d at 320.
102. See discussion supra Part III.A.2-3.
103. See Butz v. World Wide, Inc., 492 N.W.2d 88, 89 (N.D. 1992) (blending authority from
different states with prior North Dakota law that indirectly discusses the issue presented).
104. Hayes, ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318 (citing United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 870-71,
874 (9th Cir. 2005)).

2012]

CASE COMMENT

507

B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Initially, the court briefly outlined the background of the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures,105 and stated the Fourth
Amendment offers protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,106
as does the North Dakota Constitution.107 The court remarked that,
generally, a search warrant must be issued from a neutral and detached
magistrate before law enforcement officers can search a person or a
home.108 Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held
“[w]arrantless searches inside a person’s home are presumptively
unreasonable.”109 However, the court went on to state that North Dakota
recognizes there are exceptions when a warrant is not needed to enter a
home.110 One of those exceptions is consent.111
1.

Consent

In order for consent to be valid, it must be voluntarily given.112 This
means, “[a] district court must ‘determine whether the consent was
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.’”113 The court stated the
elements to be considered when determining voluntariness are: (1) the
condition and characteristics of the defendant at the time of consent, and (2)
the circumstances of the setting in which the consent was given.114

105. Id. ¶ 37, 809 N.W.2d at 321.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
107. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated . . . .”).
108. Hayes, ¶ 37, 809 N.W.2d at 321; see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181
(1990) (“The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home,
whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.”).
109. Hayes, ¶ 37, 809 N.W.2d at 321 (quoting State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 11, 685
N.W.2d 120, 124). The United States Supreme Court has previously come to the same
conclusion. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.”).
110. Hayes, ¶ 38; see also State v. Decoteau, 1999 ND 77, ¶¶ 19-20, 592 N.W.2d 579, 585
(recognizing a “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement for a home entry);
City of Fargo v. Lee, 1998 ND 126, ¶ 10, 580 N.W.2d 580, 582. (recognizing an “exigent
circumstances” exception); State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539, 543 (N.D. 1981) (defining “exigent
circumstances” as “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to
life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction
of evidence”).
111. Hayes, ¶ 38, 809 N.W.2d at 321.
112. State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 116 (N.D. 1979).
113. Hayes, ¶ 38, 809 N.W.2d at 321 (quoting State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 16, 566
N.W.2d 410, 413).
114. Id. (citing State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 26, 685 N.W.2d 120, 127).
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When discussing the elements listed above, the court pointed to the fact
that a government agent testified Hayes was left with only two choices
regarding consenting to a search of her home.115 Hayes could either
consent to the warrantless search of her home, or she could violate her bail
conditions which would trigger her arrest for “failing to comply with the
district court’s order.”116 The court held under the circumstances Hayes
was presented with, her consent was “based upon duress or coercion” and
therefore was not voluntary.117
The court’s “totality of the circumstances” approach to the analysis is
in line with its previous decisions.118 And while there have not been many
challenges relating to consent under duress in North Dakota, the approach
taken by the court in this case seems to mirror their previous analytical
method.119 While not cited in the court’s decision, the court’s previous
ruling in City of Fargo v. Ellison120 appears to be most on point regarding
consent under duress.121
In Ellison, police arrived at an apartment dwelling after receiving a
complaint of a loud party.122 After the defendant arrived at the door, the
police asked for consent to enter the residence and the defendant refused.123
The defendant later consented to the entry and search of her apartment, “but
only after she was threatened with both arrest and handcuffing if she chose
to exercise her constitutional right to refuse the police entry.”124 The court
held the defendant’s consent had not been voluntarily given.125 The ruling
in Hayes seems to reinforce the court’s earlier assertion in Ellison that
consent given in the face of arrest amounts to consent under duress and
cannot be considered voluntary.126

115. Id. ¶ 39.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See State v. Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d 381, 385; State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND
157, ¶ 13, 685 N.W.2d 120, 124 (citing United States v. Patacchi, 602 F.2d 218, 219 (9th Cir.
1979)).
119. See State v. Guscette, 2004 ND 71, ¶ 9, 678 N.W.2d 126, 130 (holding consent to
search a vehicle was voluntarily given due to the fact there was “no threat or show of force” by the
officer when he asked for consent to search).
120. 2001 ND 175, 635 N.W.2d 151.
121. See Ellison, ¶¶ 13-14, 635 N.W.2d at 155-56.
122. Id. ¶ 2, 635 N.W.2d at 153.
123. Id.
124. Id. ¶ 14, 635 N.W.2d at 156.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Good Faith Reliance

Having dismissed the State’s consent argument, the court next focused
on the State’s argument that Hayes’ motion to suppress was properly denied
because officers had relied in good faith on the bond order when conducting
the search.127 Noting the State cited no authority that the good faith
exception applies to a bond order,128 the court conducted a brief overview
of the four instances in which the court has previously held the good faith
exception inapplicable:
(1) when the issuing magistrate was misled by false information
intentionally or negligently given by the affiant; (2) when the
magistrate totally abandoned her judicial role and failed to act in a
neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant was based on
an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) when
a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially
deficient warrant.129
In this case, the court referenced instances (3) and (4) when analyzing the
bond order.130
The court reasoned because the bond order itself provided for
warrantless searches of Hayes’ person, vehicle, and residence, and there
was no affidavit attached to the bond order, the order lacked indicia of
probable cause.131 Also, the court noted, nowhere on the bond order was it
stated the particular thing to be seized or the particular residence to be
searched – both of which are requirements under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.132 Given the lack of probable cause on the
bond order, as well as its facial deficiency, the court held the good faith
exception did not apply to the officer’s unreasonable reliance on the bond
order.133
The analysis completed by the court in Hayes regarding the bond order
logically flows from prior court decisions involving the good faith

127. State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 40, 809 N.W.2d 309, 321-22.
128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 41, 809 N.W.2d at 322 (citing State v. Utvick, 2004 ND 36, ¶ 26, 675 N.W.2d
387).
130. Id. ¶ 42.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”). The North Dakota Constitution has the same requirements.
N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
133. Hayes, ¶¶ 42-43, 809 N.W.2d at 322.
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exception.134 However, the application of good faith exception analysis to a
bond order is an extension of previous North Dakota decisions that have
followed that analysis only when discussing officer reliance on invalid
warrants.135
IV. IMPACT
Deciding an issue of first impression, the North Dakota Supreme Court
analyzed the circumstances under which a pretrial release condition can
require warrantless searches.136 After Hayes, if a district court wishes to
implement a pretrial release condition under Rule 46(a)(2)(M), it needs to
issue special findings.137 What is less clear after Hayes, is what is required
at a preliminary hearing in order to assure the pretrial release condition is
adequately supported by special findings.138 Additionally, it is unclear
under what circumstances, if ever, the good faith exception will apply to
bond orders authorizing warrantless searches of a bailee’s person, vehicle,
or home.139
A. EXPLICIT FINDINGS: WHAT STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN TO
SATISFY THE FINDINGS REQUIREMENT?
The court did not specify what would satisfy the new special findings
when implementing a bail condition under Rule 46(a)(2)(M). The court
also did not specify what level of proof would be needed in order to support
the assertion that a warrantless search condition would be warranted – it
only vaguely stated that the conditions implemented should have a
“reasonable assurance” that they will lead to the defendant’s appearance at
trial.140 The court also asserted the ordering court’s reasoning must be able
to be reviewed.141 Also referenced was the fact there was no evidence or
testimony entered at Hayes’ initial appearance that related to the warrantless

134. See State v. Lunde, 2008 ND 142, ¶¶ 15-19, 752 N.W.2d 630, 636-37 (holding the good
faith exception did not apply “because the search warrant was based on an affidavit lacking in
probable cause indicia rendering official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”); State v.
Herrick, 1999 ND 1, ¶¶ 12-16, 588 N.W.2d 847, 849-50.
135. See State v. Dodson, 2003 ND 187, ¶ 27, 671 N.W.2d 825, 835 (holding the good faith
exception applied to police reliance on a warrant issued based on an affidavit that lacked probable
cause); State v. Huges, 1999 ND 24, ¶ 8, 589 N.W.2d 912, 915 (holding the good faith exception
applied to officer reliance on a no-knock warrant that lacked probable cause).
136. See discussion supra Part III.A.
137. Hayes, ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318.
138. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
139. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
140. Hayes, ¶ 33, 809 N.W.2d at 320.
141. Id. ¶ 34.
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search requirement of her bail.142 This indicates in future cases where the
government asks for a magistrate to order a pretrial release condition that is
not specifically listed in the statute, the government will likely need to be
prepared to enter testimony into the record regarding the relevancy of the
condition that is being sought.143
This could have a major impact on initial appearances in North Dakota.
While North Dakota has a smaller population with relatively low rates of
crime,144 these rates appear to be changing with the recent oil boom in the
Western area of the state.145 It is yet to be seen how much stress the special
findings requirement will put on already over burdened courts in that
region,146 and whether that will have an effect on the frequency with which
Rule 46(a)(2)(M) is utilized by the courts.
B. WILL THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION APPLY TO A BOND ORDER
THAT HAS AN ATTACHED PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT?
At the end of the court’s good faith exception analysis, it stated a
“warrantless search provision in a bond order is too remote a circumstance
to be compared to a probable cause determination resulting in a search
warrant.”147 This sentiment is confusing given the fact it is given directly
after the court did that exact comparison.148 The court clearly stated the
bond order was facially deficient149 and lacking in “indicia of probable
cause”150 – both of which are standard elements of traditional good faith
analysis.151
The court did analyze the good faith exception in response to the
State’s argument the exception should apply to the bond order.152 This
142. Id. ¶ 31, 809 N.W.2d at 319.
143. Id. (“The State did not provide, nor did the district court consider, evidence or testimony
at Hayes’ initial appearance showing a likelihood Hayes would not appear at trial without the
imposition of the warrantless search conditions of pretrial release.”).
144. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES BY STATE (2010), available at http://www fbi.gov/about-us/chij/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/
2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl05.xls.
145. Jennifer Joas, Report Shows Crime Numbers in Western ND, KFYR – TV (July 2,
2012), http://www kfyrtv.com/News_Stories.asp?news=57962.
146. CLAIRE ZILLMAN, BAKKEN BOOM CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS FOR NORTH
DAKOTA COURTS (2012), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202568269279&sl
return=20120908154036.
147. Hayes, ¶ 43, 809 N.W.2d at 322.
148. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
149. Hayes, ¶ 42, 809 N.W.2d at 322 (“The bond order also did not provide for a particular
residence to be searched or a particular thing to be seized, as required in a search warrant by the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”).
150. Id.
151. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
152. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.

512

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:495

seems to signify if a bond order was issued in the future, joined by a
probable cause affidavit which was later found to be lacking, the good faith
exception would be applicable using traditional good faith exception
analysis. Additionally, it should be noted that in future cases, another issue
arising in conjunction with good faith reliance on a bond order is at what
point the probable cause supporting the bond order would be stale.153
C. SHOULD THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATURE AMEND
RULE 46(A)(2) TO ALLOW FOR A WARRANTLESS SEARCH
CONDITION FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE?
Given the increased crime rates in western North Dakota,154 it may be
time for the state legislature to discuss whether the state would benefit from
allowing district courts to impose warrantless searches on defendants
granted bail. If the legislature implemented this bail condition in a manner
that ensured it would only be used when supported by probable cause, it
seems likely that the North Dakota Supreme Court would approve.155
One possibility would be to tie it to defendants who are charged only
with certain crimes – such as certain drug offenses. North Dakota has
already demonstrated its willingness to treat drug defendants in a
specialized manner.156 Also, considering the recent spike in drug
overdoses,157 and the public’s growing concern over the problem,158 this
might be the best opportunity the state legislature will have to get this
pretrial release condition implemented with the public’s approval. If the
legislature did decide to codify the warrantless search bail requirement, it
would lessen any future uncertainty as to what burden the State would have
when attempting to get the condition put upon defendants under Rule
46(a)(2)(M).159

153. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(D) (requiring a warrant be executed within ten days of
issuance).
154. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
155. In Hayes, the court relied heavily upon United States v. Scott, which allowed for
warrantless searches on an accused as a condition of pretrial release as long as it was supported by
a showing of probable cause. ¶ 19, 809 N.W.2d at 316 (citing United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d
863, 872 (9th Cir. 2005)).
156. See supra footnote 44.
157. Law Enforcement Agencies Hold ‘Emergency Meeting’ in GF on Deadly Synthetic Drug
Use, WDAZ TELEVISION (June 19, 2012), http://www.wdaz.com/event/article/id/14255/.
158. Piper Weiss, 2C-I or ‘Smiles’: The New Killer Drug Every Parent Should Know About,
SHINE FROM YAHOO! (Sept. 20, 2012), http://shine.yahoo.com/healthy-living/2c-smiles-killerdrug-every-parent-know-234200299 html.
159. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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V. CONCLUSION
After Hayes, any bail condition imposed under North Dakota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2)(M) must be supported by special findings.160
While the court did not strictly rule the bail condition of consenting to
warrantless searches of a defendant’s person, vehicle, and home violated
either the United States or North Dakota Constitutions,161 the opinion did
express that imposing the condition was an abuse of discretion when left
unsupported by special findings.162 The court also held consent cannot be
voluntary when the defendant is faced with either consenting or violating
the terms of his or her bail.163 Finally, the good faith reliance doctrine does
not apply to facially deficient bond orders that are not supported by
probable cause.164
After this decision, district courts may be required to enter evidence,
which could include testimony, in order to satisfy the special findings
requirement needed to support any bail condition made under Rule
46(a)(2)(M).165 Also, officers are now on notice that bond orders which are
facially deficient under the Fourth Amendment and do not include an
affidavit showing probable cause, cannot be relied on to execute a search.166
Claire L. Smith*

160. Hayes, ¶ 26, 809 N.W.2d at 318.
161. Id.
162. Id. ¶ 35, 809 N.W.2d at 321.
163. Id. ¶ 39.
164. Id. ¶ 42, 809 N.W.2d at 322.
165. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
166. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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